Reference · built on requestConnectorIndustrial & building protocols

IEC 60870-5-104

Telecontrol data and commands between RTUs and control centers as IEC 60870-5-101 ASDUs over TCP/IP.

About

IEC 60870-5-104 is the IEC telecontrol companion standard that combines the application layer of IEC 60870-5-101 with the transport functions of TCP/IP. It applies to telecontrol equipment and systems with coded bit serial data transmission for monitoring and controlling geographically widespread processes. A controlling station in the control center talks to controlled stations in the field over an open TCP/IP interface, and routers can carry the traffic across X.25, Frame Relay, ATM, or ISDN without the end systems knowing. The standard defines the APCI framing, the ASDUs selected from IEC 60870-5-101, redundant connections, and the interoperability list each device publishes.

Through Fibric, a controlling station of its own connects to the RTUs you name, runs general interrogation and receives events as they occur, and hands each change to an operator. A command is proposed for your approval and sent once, with a receipt.

This is a reference listing. It documents what Fibric would read from IEC 60870-5-104 and what it could propose, based on the vendor's published interfaces. Fibric builds it under a managed deployment when you request it; selecting it here installs nothing.

Inputs

  • Data acquired by polling and by cyclic data transmission, as IEC 60870-5-101 ASDUs carried in I format APDUs
  • Events acquired from the controlled station as they occur (clause 7.4), rather than on the next poll
  • The full station image returned by a general interrogation (clause 7.5) after connection or on demand
  • Integrated totals such as energy counters, transmitted under clause 7.8
  • Connection state from Start/Stop transmission control and the test procedure, carried in U format frames
  • Archive files requested with F_SC_NB_1 QueryLog (type 127) under file transfer in the control and monitor directions
  • Which of a controlled station's redundant connections is active (clause 10)

Proposed actions

  • Target capability: propose a single, double, or regulating step command (C_SC_TA_1, C_DC_TA_1, C_RC_TA_1) with a CP56Time2a time tag
  • Target capability: propose a set-point command as a normalized, scaled, or short floating-point value (C_SE_TA_1, C_SE_TB_1, C_SE_TC_1)
  • Target capability: propose a clock synchronization of the controlled station under clause 7.6
  • Target capability: propose a parameter load (clause 7.9) or a general interrogation on demand

Proposed actions are target capabilities. Every action runs propose-first and needs a validated deployment and the appropriate permissions.

What you can build

  • Confirm the field matches the picture

    After a reconnect, the operator runs a general interrogation and compares the returned station image with the last known values. Points that came back different or missing are listed for a person.

    With Data Freshness, Sensor Health

  • Act on a curtailment order

    When the grid operator calls for a reduction, the operator proposes set-point commands to the RTUs you name. You approve once. Each command carries a time tag, and the receipt records station, object, and value.

    With Event Response, Export Limit

  • Test a generator remotely

    The operator proposes the start command, watches the measured values and integrated totals come back as events, and files the run against the test schedule.

    With Generator Test

  • Keep RTU clocks in step

    Time tags are only useful if RTU clocks agree. The operator compares event time tags with arrival time and proposes a clock synchronization to the stations that drift.

    With Integration Health

Requirements

  • TCP/IP reach from the controlling station to each controlled station, directly or through the routers the standard allows for X.25, Frame Relay, ISDN, and ATM
  • Each device's interoperability list (clause 9): which ASDUs, basic application functions, and network configuration it supports
  • The addresses of the stations and information objects you want, as set in the RTU configuration
  • For IEC 62351-5 security, devices and a controlling station that both implement the IEC TS 60870-5-7 message formats
Authentication
The standard states that security mechanisms are outside its scope; IEC 62351-3 profiles TLS 1.2 and 1.3 for the TCP connection, and IEC 62351-5 with IEC TS 60870-5-7 adds application-layer authentication and encryption per controlling station and controlled station association.

Limits

  • IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 60870-5-101 are sold by the IEC; this listing is written from the published scope, table of contents, and abstracts
  • The base protocol has no authentication or encryption, so an unprotected TCP link accepts any command that reaches it
  • Only the ASDUs a device lists in its interoperability clause can be used, and vendors commonly implement a subset
  • Alternative ASDUs from other IEC 60870-5 companion standards, such as IEC 60870-5-102, may be carried but are not described in Part 5-104

Access and pricing

Reference listing. Fibric builds the connector under a managed deployment when you request it. Your quote covers the build, capabilities, usage, and support.

Request IEC 60870-5-104 ↗

Questions and answers

Is IEC 60870-5-104 the same as IEC 60870-5-101?
No. Part 5-101 is the companion standard for basic telecontrol tasks over serial links. Part 5-104 keeps the 101 application layer and ASDUs and carries them over TCP/IP, adding the APCI control field with I, S, and U formats, Start/Stop control, and redundant connections.
Does IEC 60870-5-104 encrypt or authenticate commands?
Not by itself. The scope note says security mechanisms are outside the standard. IEC 62351-3 profiles TLS for the TCP connection, and IEC 62351-5 with IEC TS 60870-5-7 defines message formats so a receiver can check that an APDU came from an authorized user and was not modified in transit.
What happens when the connection drops?
Clause 5.1 protects against loss and duplication of messages by numbering I format APDUs, and clause 10 defines redundant connections so a controlled station can hold more than one connection to the controlling station and switch which one carries user data.
Ask about IEC 60870-5-104

Ask about the capabilities and requirements in this listing.

For project-specific requirements, contact Fibric.